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Due to the absence of a fiscal reform that increases tax revenues 
significantly in the near future, Mexico needs to adopt a structural 
correction in its public finance through the implementation of a rule. 
This correction will eliminate budget volatility and will give fiscal policy 
more countercyclical power. Since the structural rule will promote 
fiscal certainty, the country will reinforce investors' confidence and will 
strengthen public finances. The rule does not substitute the fiscal 
reform needed, but it makes the reform less urgent since it introduces 
a structural discipline in the government expenditure, which also 
makes the budgeting process more efficient. This paper proposes and 
evaluates the implementation of such a fiscal rule to the case of 
Mexico. 
JEL: H61, H62, H68. 
 
Keywords: Fiscal policy, public finance, budget equilibrium, federal budget, potential  
       output, structural rule, fiscal reform. 
 
                                                 
*/
 The author would like to thank Dr. Lawrence R. Klein (Nobel Laureate in Economics 1980) from the 
University of Pennsylvania and Dr. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis from the University of Chile for their valuable 
comments and suggestions to improve this research paper. 
EconModels, Society of Policy Modeling, Elsevier 
3 
1. Overview 
In a country where public finance is highly dependent on both the 
business cycle and the price of a single commodity, fiscal policy 
becomes remarkably volatile and tends to amplify the ups and downs 
of the cycle: overheating the economy in booms and deepening the 
contraction in recessions. To isolate public finance from that volatility, 
providing more fiscal certainty and ensuring long-term sustainability, 
fiscal policy should be subject to a structural rule that eliminates its 
procyclical nature and strengthens its countercyclical power. In fact, 
fiscal policy should be used to influence the business cycle, not the 
other way around. In other words, it should be used to moderate the 
cycle when growth outpaces its potential rate, and it should stimulate 
growth when it stays below potential. The structural rule is also a 
powerful fiscal stabilizer and a mechanism to promote a growth path 
consistent with production capacity. In addition, the rule contributes to 
control inflation since it promotes growth around potential. 
In Mexico, given the political obstacles to implement a profound fiscal 
reform, the introduction of a structural fiscal rule becomes the option 
politically feasible to ensure fiscal sustainability and reduce the 
dependence of fiscal revenues from oil. Additionally, the approval of a 
fiscal reform in the future could improve the rule's efficiency, since the 
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reform would expand the structural level of tax collection through the 
increase of potential GDP. 
The fiscal rule would also eliminate the inefficiencies in the design and 
execution of the federal budget by preventing the country from 
unexpected and dramatic budget cuts every time that the economy 
faces internal or external shocks.  Hence, the rule can turn itself in a 
powerful instrument of the country's macroeconomic defense system. 
2. Fiscal procyclicality and budget volatility 
Over the past three decades, the Mexican economy has reproduced 
and even amplified the international business cycle, particularly the 
cycle of the U.S. economy, given the openness process initiated in the 
decade of the 80s. Due to the existence of macroeconomic imbalances, 
the country had to implement policy adjustments to correct the 
disequilibrium. Thus, the traditional recipe always included a currency 
devaluation accompanied by fiscal and monetary tightening1. Under 
these circumstances, the economy not only suffered the negative 
effects of the external shock but also the demand depression caused 
by the policy adjustment, consequently resulting in deeper recessions. 
Since 1994, with the trade integration with North America, the 
Mexican economy strengthened its dependence from the U.S. business 
                                                 
1
 An example was the peso crisis at the end of 1994; see Klein and Coutiño (1997). 
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cycle. During the past two recessions in the U.S. (2001 and 2008-
2009), Mexico amplified the economic falls of its main trade partners. 
Even though monetary policy did not react to those two crises by 
hiking the interest rate, fiscal policy did tighten in 2001 and ended 
2009 cutting the budget twice, after pretending to be stimulative at 
the beginning of the year. The limited fiscal stimulus in 2009, and the 
slow monetary relaxation, did not allow the economy to decouple from 
the U.S. cycle for the first time in decades. However, despite the low 
counter-cyclical power of fiscal policy, Mexico was able to avoid a 
deeper contraction but did not escape a fall of 6.5%, while the U.S. 
only fell 2.4%. 
Same way, fiscal procyclicality also works in boom times. In this case, 
fiscal expenditure expands with higher economic growth, thus 
additionally fueling the economic expansion. However, given the 
absence of a rule or commitment, nothing forces the government to 
save in booms in order to spend in crisis. This raises the need of a 
stricter fiscal discipline in times of economic expansion to increase the 
countercyclical power in times of recession.  
Mexico has shown political difficulties to implement a deep fiscal 
reform that raises tax collection and reduces fiscal dependence from 
oil revenues. Given the political rejection to reforms, the introduction 
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of a structural correction becomes the second-best option to provide 
public finances with long-term sustainability. As a result, the rule will 
allow reduce the country-risk level, but will also give fiscal policy high 
power for growth stabilization. The rule does not mean that fiscal 
reform becomes unnecessary, but only less urgent.  
The country's public finances, every year, are mostly determined by 
the expected economic growth rate and the estimated oil price. As a 
consequence, the federal budget results affected as soon as any of 
those two factors change significantly. This makes the federal budget 
extremely volatile and subject to unexpected cuts every time that the 
economy suffers a negative shock, thus aggravating the economy's 
downturn and deteriorating the vicious cycle of “lower spending-poorer 
growth-deeper fiscal imbalance”.  
The evident fiscal instability makes it imperative for the government to 
break the fiscal dependence from the business cycle and from the 
volatility of international prices2. This can be done by the 
implementation of a structural rule, which makes the federal budget to 
be subject to more stable factors, such as the potential growth rate 
and the long-term price of oil. This way, the rule will eliminate the 
inefficiencies represented by the stop-and-go process in the economy. 
                                                 
2
 A conceptual analysis on how to stabilize public finances can be found in Coutiño (2010). 
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3. The structural rule approach 
The structural equilibrium can be defined as the level of spending that 
matches the level of structural revenues determined by potential GDP, 
thus resulting in a zero structural balance. Given that potential growth 
does not change in the short run, since it represents the economy’s 
steady state, then structural revenues also grow at a constant rate. 
This way, structural fiscal revenues are insulated from the volatility of 
the business cycle, consequently providing stability to public 
expenditure. 
Obviously, tax revenue is the only component subject to potential 
growth. The second component, fiscal oil revenues, is strongly subject 
to oil price volatility. In this case, it is important to compute a 
structural price for oil, which could be estimated as a long-term 
average with sufficient history and some futures. Hence, since the 
structural price is determined mechanically, it will be more stable and 
will avoid the political manipulation of estimates used in the 
preparation of the federal budget.  
The structural balance rule is an automatic mechanism of fiscal 
correction, which generates a surplus in times of booms and a 
compensation of spending in times of downturns. As we can see in 
graph 3, given that the growth rate of public spending is constant over 
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time (a function of potential output Y*), the structural rule 
automatically generates savings when current economic growth 
outpaces its potential rate, as in T1 (the current level of fiscal 
revenues, R, is higher than its structural level, R*). On the contrary, in 
T2 a deficit can be cancelled (using savings from the past or new debt) 
when current economic growth is lower than its potential rate, since 
current fiscal revenues are lower than its structural level.  
Graph 3 
Fiscal Saving and Dis-saving 
Structural 
Spending:  
G*=R*= f(Y*)  













Therefore, the rule not only generates fiscal certainty but it also 
promotes a steady growth path, since it states that the level of public 
expenditure must be consistent with the economy's potential capacity.  
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Since a structural fiscal equilibrium is reached when the level of public 
spending equals the level of structural revenues, which depends on the 
potential output, then the rule’s application involves the estimation of 
some variables and coefficients. The structural fiscal equilibrium is 
defined as: 
SFE = YF*-GF* = 0       (1) 
where SFE stands for structural fiscal equilibrium, YF* is the structural 
level of fiscal revenues, and GF* is the structural level of fiscal 
expenditure. Obviously, the equilibrium states that SFE=0, which 
requires that YF*=GF*. Hence, regardless the growth rate expected by 
the government for a current year, the expenditure will always expand 
at a constant rate determined by the potential growth rate (%GDP*). 
This comes from the fact that the structural level of the expenditure is 
automatically determined by the structural level of revenues. 
Total structural revenues have two components, tax collection (Tx) 
and fiscal revenues from oil (OR). The first depends on economic 
activity, while the second on the oil market. To compute their 
structural levels (Tx*, OR*) we have to insulate them from the 
volatility, thus: 
YF* = Tx* + OR*        (2) 
EconModels, Society of Policy Modeling, Elsevier 
11 
The structural tax collection can be fairly estimated by the fiscal 
elasticity applied to the potential output. Fiscal elasticity (ξfp) is 
defined as the percentage change in tax revenues (%Tx) generated by 
the percentage change in output (%GDP): 
ξfp = ∂(Tx)/∂(GDP) = (%Tx)/(%GDP)     (3) 
where ∂ is the partial derivative. To compute the growth rate of 
structural tax revenues (%Tx*), we multiply the fiscal elasticity by the 
potential growth rate (%GDP*):  
%Tx* = ξfp (%GDP*)       (4) 
from here, structural tax revenues grow at a constant rate given by a 
proportion of the potential growth rate. Having an initial level of 
structural tax collection, by assuming that GDP grows at its potential 
rate in a particular year, we can compute the level of structural tax 
collection for the following year (Tx*). We thus determine federal tax 
revenues free of the cyclical volatility. 
Regarding the potential output, a fair estimation can be obtained from 
the use of a Cobb-Douglas production function with technological 
change3, where the degree of returns to scale does not change the 
estimated parameters significantly. The potential growth rate obtained 
                                                 
3
 For an econometric estimation for Mexico, see Coutiño (2000). 
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is similar to those computed by the Bank of Mexico4, around 3.5%5. 
Moreover, given the disinvestment process suffered by the Mexican 
economy in the past decade6, a potential growth rate of 3% would also 
be representative. 
The second component of total revenues, fiscal oil revenues 
representing one third of the total, depends on the volume of the 
country’s crude production and international oil prices. Given that 
production capacity does not change in the short run significantly, then 
the volume produced and exported can be taken as constant. 
Therefore, the volatility in oil revenues is mostly explained by 
international prices of oil. To reduce the effects of price volatility on 
fiscal oil revenues, it is necessary to estimate a structural parameter 
given by the long-term price. The structural oil price can be obtained 
as the average of prices in the past 20 years adjusted by the average 
of futures prices in the next 5 years. However, due to volatility in 
futures prices, since they are subject to daily news and geopolitical 
events, the inclusion of few years of futures would be enough. This 
way, the level of fiscal oil revenues are estimated free of price 
volatility. 
                                                 
4
 See Banco de Mexico (2000). 
5
 The GDP average growth rate from 1970 to 2009 is exactly 3.5%. 
6
 See Coutiño (2009a), and Coutiño (2009b).  
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By now we have already determined the level of total structural 
revenues, which allows us to compute the structural expenditure by 
identity, and consequently the structural balance. From identity (1), 
the structural expenditure is also determined by the relatively constant 
growth rate of structural revenues. 
%GF* = %YF*        (5) 
4. Beyond the structural equilibrium 
The introduction of the structural rule can be done at any point of the 
business cycle, with no need of initial conditions in terms of fiscal 
surplus7. Thus, in the first case (C1) in Graph 4, if current economic 
growth exceeds the potential growth, then the rule automatically 
generates a fiscal surplus –since the growth rate of current revenues 
would be higher than growth of structural spending, which should be 
saved for the future. In other words: 
If:  (%GDP) ＞ (%GDP*) 
then: (YF) ＞ (GF*)   ＝＞ FB ＞ 0, where FB stands for fiscal balance. 
                                                 
7
 However, as suggested by Ffrench-Davis, it would be more convenient for a government to start the rule 
during the boom side of the cycle. 
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Graph 4 
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On the opposite case (C2), the rule generates a deficit, but given that 
there are no initial conditions in terms of savings in the past, then the 
government will be allowed to issue debt in order to finance the 
structural level of the expenditure.  
If:  (%GDP) ＜ (%GDP*) 
then: (YF) ＜ (GF*)   ＝＞ FB ＜ 0  
Also, since the level of spending does not reduce with lower economic 
growth, then the economy’s initial slowdown does not aggravate. This 
way, fiscal policy acts as a shock absorber, reducing the damage to 
economic growth. Hence, fiscal surpluses in the future would be used 
to cancel debt issued in times of low growth, and vice versa, future 
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deficits can be cancelled by savings generated in the past. This way, 
the federal budget is maintained unchanged regardless the current 
economic growth year by year. 
The implementation of this rule in Mexico, however, is not free of 
troubles. Given the amount of restrictions and commitments to which 
the federal budget is attached, the acceptance of the structural rule 
will definitely face political resistance. For the rule to be efficient and 
effective, it must obligate the government to save every surplus 
generated in booms, which in principle eliminates the distribution of 
extra revenues to states and municipalities, among other things. Thus, 
political groups will not be willing to sacrifice the dividends they get 
from extra revenues of oil, to put them in a stabilization fund. 
However, the proposed structural rule is flexible enough to 
accommodate that kind of political resistance. This implies a sacrifice 
from all parts, but particularly from the federal government. The 
solution to the political friction would imply to make the rule stricter 
rather than flexible. In other words, to accommodate those political 
demands and even finance social programs (education, poverty and 
employment), the government could set the rule at a level of a 
structural surplus of 1% of GDP instead of a structural equilibrium 
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(zero balance)8. This should be accompanied by the government’s 
commitment to saving every surplus in excess of the 1% structural 
surplus. This way, resources equivalent to the initial 1% structural 
surplus can be used by the government to accommodate the political 
demands and social programs, without compromising the goal and 
efficiency of the rule. It is important to say that the 1% structural 
surplus, to be distributed politically and socially, would be equivalent 
to $10 billion in 2011. 
This version of the rule can certainly resolve the political frictions, but 
will also allow the government to deactivate the complicated 
distribution process of extra revenues from oil and will eliminate the 
political manipulation of the estimates for the oil price. In fact, states 
and municipalities would always receive the same proportion of 
resources generated by the structural surplus rule, 1% of GDP. In 
other words, the rule also provides certainty to states governments in 
terms of the extra revenues to be received every year, regardless the 
current price of oil in international markets. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The Mexican fiscal system is one of the weakest in Latin America and 
among the OECD members, given its low coefficient of tax revenues to 
                                                 
8
 Chile originally set its rule at 1% structural surplus. See Velasco et al., (2007), and Ffrench-Davis (2010). 
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output. At the same time, the country faces increasing needs of 
modernization and social spending. In this sense, the optimal solution 
would be a profound reform that increases tax collection and makes 
public spending more efficient. However, the political system seems to 
be unprepared to approve an ample fiscal reform, as it has been 
demonstrated by the continuous rejection to any fiscal proposal made 















Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP, % 
Source: ECLAC, SHCP 
 
Mexico has wasted time in the past decade and the fiscal system 
remains inefficient. Fiscal uncertainty has started to damage the 
country-risk level, which will impose higher financial costs to the 
country in case of further fiscal deterioration. Thus, in the absence of a 
politically-feasible fiscal reform in the short term, the government 
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should adopt a structural correction and discipline in the exercise of its 
federal budget, as the one proposed. Such a correction not only solves 
the fiscal problem from the expenditure side, whose level is attached 
to structural revenues, but it also insulates the federal budget from the 
volatility generated by cyclical factors and international oil prices. 
Indeed, the introduction of the structural rule would immediately 
eliminate fiscal uncertainty and would reduce the country-risk level, 
turning itself in a powerful instrument of stabilization and growth 
promotion. Even though the rule is not a substitute of the fiscal reform, 
it makes it less urgent. Likewise, the approval of a profound reform 
does not substitute the structural rule, it rather complements it. Thus, 
since the reform will certainly increase the economy’s potential 
capacity, then the structural equilibrium will strengthen and give the 
fiscal policy a higher countercyclical power. 
Finally, given that the structural rule provides fiscal certainty and also 
the means to automatically correct imbalances, neither the 
government nor markets would worry about short-term deficits, which 
would be transitory events by nature. The rule will also represent a 
significant dividend in terms of efficiency in the budgeting process, 
since it will eliminate the useless political debate regarding the size of 
the federal budget. 
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